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Abstract 
This article analyses and quantifies the influence that the political 
party ruling the regional government has upon the economic 
performance of the corresponding public service broadcaster. An 
analysis of the economic performance of regional broadcasting 
companies was undertaken over the period from 1995 to 2016, 
studying variables such as expenses per employee, total expenses, 
total assets, ROA, assets turnover and total share; and their 
relationship with the political party ruling in the region. The 
correlation analysis, based on the Krukal-Wallis test, confirms the 
political parties' influence on the broadcasting entities' 
management approach. The results obtained indicate that there 
are significant differences in economic performance depending 
on the political party (Partido Popular, Spanish Socialist Workers 
Party and nationalist-regionalist parties) which governs the 
Autonomous Community, and suggest research areas of interest 
in order to examine in greater detail the impact of these parties in 
each case. 
 
Keywords 
Governance, regional television, public television, political 
party, economic performance. 
 
1. Introduction 
Regional public service broadcasters in Spain originated with the passing 
of Spanish Law 46/1983, of December the 26th, which regulated the third 
television channel at the beginning of the 1980s. Since their creation, they 
have contributed significantly to the democratic development of Spanish society. In addition, 
they have helped invigorate local cultural industries and generated economic development in 
their respective regions (Fernández Quijada, 2009; Guimerá & Blasco Gil, 2012). 
However, these public entities have been called into question regarding various issues 
such as their high cost, the independence of their content with respect to the corresponding 
regional political government, and their management of production activities (Muñoz, 2011; 
Campos, 2012; Artero et al., 2015; Olmo & Navarro, 2015). In addition, audiences have decreased 
significantly over time. From the beginning of the 90s until the year 2016 viewership figures 
declined significantly, from an audience share of 15.6% to 7.4% (Kantar Media, 2016). In other 
words, there has been a decrease of more than 100%. 
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Numerous investigations carried out in different knowledge areas such as journalism, 
audiovisual communications, sociology and media economics have looked at regional public 
service broadcasters in Spain over recent decades. In the latter area –media economics–, 
there is a growing body of knowledge which analyses and outlines the influence of the 
economic policies of regional governments on the behaviour and economic performance of 
regional public service broadcasters (Casado, 2005; Miguel de Bustos & Casado, 2012; Marzal 
et al., 2015; Casado et al., 2016). However, these studies do not differentiate based on the 
orientation of the political party which governs the Autonomous Community and which, as 
such, oversees the production activity of the public television entities. 
In light of this situation, the principal aim of this study is to analyse and quantify the 
influence that the political party which oversees the regional television networks has on their 
behaviour and economic performance. The empirical study covers a period of time with 
several ruling governments. 
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 consists of a review of the literature 
concerning the governance and economic management of regional public service 
broadcasters in Spain. Following this, the variables under study and the characteristics of the 
sample are outlined. The results are presented in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 covers 
conclusions, limitations and future areas of research. 
2. Governance and economic management of regional public service broadcasters 
in Spain 
The regional broadcasters are public companies whose management and administration falls 
under the control, through different instruments and mechanisms, of the regional 
government which is democratically elected by the citizens of the Autonomous Community 
where the broadcast entity is located (Fernández Alonso & Fernández Viso, 2012). Since their 
launch in the early 1980s, during a period of development and consolidation of democracy in 
Spain, these companies have contributed to regional economic development by revitalising 
the local audiovisual industry and creating jobs (Fernández Quijada, 2009; Guimerá & Blasco 
Gil, 2012). At present, once the Valencia regional entity concluded activity, 12 of the 17 
Autonomous Communities count on, at least, one regional public service television channel. 
The governance style of public service broadcasters can be shaped by means of four 
different models: governmental, professional, parliamentary and corporate (Hallin & 
Mancini, 2008). The first model –governmental–, is characterised by the governing political 
party exercising strict and substantial control over the management of the television network. 
In order to exercise this control, the political parties appoint managers whose loyalty to the 
party is more important than their professional competence. Radio Televisión Española 
(RTVE, Spanish Radio Television) used this governance model until the passing of Spanish Law 
17/2006, of June the 5th, which deals with state-owned radio and television. 
The professional model involves managing the public service entity in a very different 
way. Professionals with extensive experience in the sector are responsible for their 
management. From this perspective, responsibilities relating to audiovisual monitoring, 
approval and regulation are assigned by the political parties to experts that are considered 
impartial and that have extensive knowledge and competence in the area of audiovisual 
production. This is the case with the public service broadcasters in the United Kingdom and 
the United States. 
There are also notable differences regarding management between the parliamentary 
and corporate models. The corporate model is characterised by the existence of a diverse 
array of people who play a part in the management of the broadcast services. It is considered 
a very democratic model (Humpreys, 1996) in which various groups (professional, societal, 
etc.), along with representatives of the ruling political parties, analyse and make joint 
decisions regarding production at the public service network. Public service television in 
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Holland has opted for this model of management. Finally, in the parliamentary model, 
management decisions are taken by means of negotiations arising from the Parliament where 
the network is located. Thus the political parties, according to their representation in 
parliament, make the decisions regarding the management of the television network. This is 
the model which governs the activity of Spanish public service broadcasters at national (RTVE) 
and regional level: Euskal Irrati Telebista (EiTB), Corporación Catalana de Medios 
Audiovisuales (CCMA), Corporación Radio y Televisión de Galicia (CRTVG), Radio y Televisión 
de Andalucía (RTVA), Radio Televisión Madrid S.A, Radio Televisión Canaria, Radiotelevisión 
de Castilla-La Mancha (RTVCM), Ens Públic de Radiotelevisió de les Illes Balears (EPRTVIB), 
Radiotelevisión del Principado de Asturias (RTPA), Corporación Extremeña de Medios 
Audiovisuales (CEXMA), Corporación Aragonesa de Radio y Televisión (CARTV) and 
Radiotelevisión de la Región de Murcia (RTRM) (Fernández Alonso & Fernández Viso, 2012). 
Various theoretical and empirical studies have analysed the economic management and 
administration of regional broadcasters in Spain over recent decades. In order to do this, 
researchers have analysed different variables and used different methodologies and 
approaches. Some of the variables that have been considered in the literature are the 
professional, business and political profile of the directors, presidents and boards of directors 
of the regional entities (López Cepeda, 2012), the input-output ratio necessary to achieve 
production efficiency (Campos & Velasco, 2013; Artero et al., 2015), the influence of the 
management model (classic or outsourced) used by the channel on the economic performance 
obtained (Fernández Alonso, 2002; Cuesta, 2011; López Vidales et al., 2012; Orive et al., 2016) 
and the effects that regional public policies have on the activity of regional broadcasters 
(Miguel de Bustos & Casado, 2012; Marzal et al., 2015; Casado et al., 2016). 
The research conducted by López Cepeda (2012) analysed the professional profiles of the 
managers of regional broadcasters using different variables and indicators. A questionnaire 
was sent to more than 200 members of the boards of directors of the networks. The results of 
the study show significant differences in these profiles depending on the regional public 
service entity analysed. 
In the research undertaken by Campos and Velasco (2013), they determined by means of 
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) that certain regional broadcasters are not efficient in the 
management of their resources. These networks include the regional public service entities 
of Aragon, Valencia, Galicia, the Canary Islands, Asturias and Madrid. Later, Artero et al. (2015) 
confirmed these results and proposed some performance measures in order to address the 
inefficiency in production management based on variation of inputs. To this end, they 
suggested that certain networks needed to considerably reduce their external expenses and 
implement actions aimed at increasing their audience share. 
The literature has addressed the effects of the management model (classic or outsourced) 
used by regional broadcasters in order to manage production (Fernández Alonso, 2002; López 
Vidales et al., 2012). Sánchez and Sarabia (2012), from a theoretical perspective, pointed out 
that the outsourcing of part of the network's value chain can lead to a reduction in costs and 
debt at the public service broadcaster. However, this management model can result in a loss 
of internal capital and asymmetric relations within and outside the broadcast entity (Cuesta, 
2011). Recently, Orive et al. (2016) used an empirical approach to determine that the 
management model implemented influences the economic performance and the productivity 
levels achieved by the regional broadcasters. As such, broadcasters that utilise a management 
model based on outsourcing part of their value chain require fewer assets and public subsidies 
for each audience share point they achieve. In addition, these networks have less financial 
losses. 
With regard to the influence of the regional administrations' economic policies on 
regional broadcaster activity, the work of Miguel De Bustos & Casado (2012), which included 
contributions from numerous researchers, highlighted the inefficiency of certain policies 
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which hinder the sustainability of various television networks. The authors thus underscored 
aspects related to governance, budget control and political independence in production 
decisions. Later, the work of Marzal et al., (2015) analysed the causes and consequences of the 
deep economic and political crisis which many regional broadcasters found themselves in. 
The authors emphasise that significant changes in the networks' management policies were 
necessary in order to increase the credibility of the entities and improve the results of the 
networks. 
Recently, research carried out by Casado et al., (2016) analysed the impact of decisions to 
reduce public spending on regional broadcasters. The results of their research quantified 
these effects, showing a significant loss of employment and a considerable reduction in the 
turnovers of the companies in the audiovisual sector. 
However, from the review of the literature, it can be seen that the economic and political 
behaviour of the regional broadcasters is not homogeneous. In fact, in recent years, certain 
networks have had to shut down (for example, the Valencia broadcasting entity), lay off staff 
(Telemadrid) or they have seen a notable decrease in their audience (Canal Sur). However, 
other networks have consolidated and increased their audience (Canal Extremadura) or 
improved their financial performance (Aragón TV). 
Moreover, the literature has not analysed the influence of the political party’s orientation 
on the economic management of the broadcasting networks. Three different groups of 
political parties have governed and managed regional administrations during recent decades. 
The Partido Popular (PP), ideologically conservative and supportive of liberal economic 
policies, the Spanish Socialist Workers Party (PSOE in the Spanish acronym), which has a 
progressive and social democratic ideology, and the nationalist-regionalist parties (NAC) of 
each Autonomous Community. To the latter group belong the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV), 
Convergencia i Unió (CIU), Foro Asturias and Coalición Canaria (CC). All of these are 
ideologically conservative and have a strong sense of their own regional identity. 
3. Variables under study and sample characteristics 
Audiovisual corporations and, in particular, television broadcasters are complex 
organisations in terms of their economic and financial structures. In order to analyse and 
evaluate the economic performance of public service broadcasters, the literature 
distinguishes between three classes of variable (Picard, 2003; Orive et al., 2016). These 
variables are: market share, financial variables and productivity measurement variables. Data 
relating to operating income, total assets, number of employees, expenditure on material, 
expenditure on personnel, economic performance and the aggregate audience share of the 
corporation's channels have thus been collated as variables under study. 
Given this starting point, the study of the economic performance of the audiovisual 
corporations and broadcast entities over time presents significant limitations and challenges, 
related to their particular economic structure and the impact that subsidies from the public 
sector have on their income and economic performance. Furthermore, over the two decades 
under research there have been major changes in the field of accounting (the adoption of the 
new General Accounting Plan of 2007, for example), organisational restructuring and changes 
in ownership, and different taxation schemes (pro-rata VAT, for example), among others. 
These changes have had an obvious effect on the annual accounts of the organisations studied, 
especially with regard to figures dealing with income and profits. 
In addition, the worldwide economic and financial crisis of 2008-2012 had a significant 
impact on broadcast corporations and entities, especially in Spain, both as regards the 
amount of subsidies and income received, and employee numbers and volume of expenditure. 
Finally, it is difficult to study the economic and financial behaviour of the country's 
different audiovisual corporations taken on an equal footing, without bearing in mind 
significant socio-political considerations such as the number of potential viewers, the 
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political and cultural mandate upon which they were founded and to which they must 
respond, and other particular conditions that affect only some of the organisations, such as 
broadcasting in various languages. 
The problems outlined have been taken into account when designing the methodology to 
be used in the proposed analysis, and their influence has been minimised by the decision to 
focus on relative trends instead of on absolute values. In order to study the impact that the 
particular political orientation of the regional government has had on economic performance, 
it was decided to incorporate the relative year on year trend changes for each variable under 
study, such as percentage increase or decrease, thus eliminating the distorting effect of 
absolute values. Specifically, the main aspects of the methodological design employed are the 
following: 
• The use of the variables ‘result’ and ‘income’ as variables under study was discarded, 
replacing them with ROA and Asset Turnover ratios, which better facilitate the 
comparative study of year on year trends. 
• The analysis of the relative trends for each organisation is incorporated, calculating the 
positive or negative percentage change observed year on year, for each of the variables 
under study. In this way the effects of legislative changes, accounting practices and the 
different organisational structure of the organisations, on the variables selected for study 
(expenditure, number of employees, the ratios previously mentioned) is limited. 
• In the same way, given the impossibility of determining what percentage of the 
corporations' total costs, employees, assets and income corresponds solely to the 
broadcast entities, the year on year study of relative trends allows for assessment of the 
evolution of these variables in each organisation, assuming that the aforementioned 
percentage does not change significantly. 
• The ‘audience share’ variable has been taken into account in aggregate form, as the total 
of all the networks present in each region. 
The analysis of the aforementioned variables covers the period between 1996 (the first 
year for which sufficient data is available) and 2016 (the last year for which complete data is 
available). A longitudinal analysis was performed, covering more than 20 years for the entities 
created in the final decades of the last century and the first decade of the current century (see 
Table 1). The data was obtained by way of the Annual Accounts of the 13 regional public service 
broadcasters and completed using the SABI (Iberian Balance Sheets Analysis System) 
economic and financial database. 
From a statistical point of view, each year for each corporation represents one case in 
the sample, linked to the dependent variable 'political orientation in the regional government' 
of that year (PP (1), PSOE (2) or Regional/ Nationalist (3)), such that the total sample covers 214 
cases. 
Political orientation being the dependent variable, defined as the political party in the 
regional government in each year, the variables under study for each of these years and 
audiovisual corporation/ television broadcasting entities, are the following, shown in Table 2. 
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Table 1: Year the regional public service broadcaster was created. 
Organisation Commencement of broadcasting 
Political Party in 
government  
No. of 
cases 
Euskal Irrati Telebista 1982 
1996-2009 NAC. 
2010-2012 PSOE 
2013-2016 NAC. 
21 
Corporación Catalana de Medios Audiovisuales 
(CCMA) 1983 
1996-2002 NAC. 
2003-2009 PSOE 
2010-2016 NAC. 
21 
Corporación Radio e Televisión de Galicia 
(CRTV) 1985 
1996-2005 PP 
2006-2009 PSOE 
2010-2016 PP 
21 
Radio y Televisión de Andalucía (RTVA) 1989 1996-2016 PSOE 21 
Radiotelevisió Valenciana (RTVV) 1989 1996-2013 PP 21 
Radio Televisión Madrid S.A 1989 1996-2016 PP 21 
Radio Televisión Canaria 1999 1999-2016 NAC. 18 
Radiotelevisión de Castilla-La Mancha (RTVCM) 2001 
2002-2011 PSOE 
2012-2015 PP 
2016 PSOE 
15 
Ens Públic de Radiotelevisió de les Illes Balears 
(EPRTVIB) 2005 
2006-2011 PSOE 
2012-2015 PP 
2016 PSOE 
11 
Radiotelevisión del Principado de Asturias 
(RTPA) 2005 
2006-2011 PSOE 
2012 REG. 
2013-2016 PSOE 
11 
Corporación Extremeña de Medios Audiovisuales 
(CEXMA) 2006 
2006-2011 PSOE 
2012-2015 PP 
2016 PSOE 
11 
Corporación Aragonesa de Radio y Televisión 
(CARTV) 2006 
2006-2011 PSOE 
2012-2015 PP 
2016 PSOE 
11 
Radiotelevisión de la Región de Murcia (RTRM) 2006 2006-2016 PP 11 
Source: Own elaboration. 
Table 2: Variables under study. 
Organisation Autonomous Region x1 Autonomous Region x2 … Autonomous Region x13 
Year 2016 2015 … 1995 2016 2015 … 1995  2016 2015 … 1995 
(V1) Political 
party P1-3 
(V2) 
Expenditure / 
employee (G1) 
Absolute and relative value = (G1200x-G1200x-1)/G1200x-1 
(V3) Total 
expenses (G2) Absolute and relative value = (G2200x-G2200x-1)/G2200x-1 
(V4) Total 
assets (A) Absolute and relative value = (A200x-A200x-1)/A200x-1 
(V5) ROA (R1) Absolute and relative value = (R1200x-ER1200x-1)/R1200x-1 
(V6) Asset 
Turnover (R2) Absolute and relative value = (R2200x-R2200x-1)/R2200x-1 
(V7) Share 
total (ST) Absolute and relative value = (ST200x-ST200x-1)/ST200x-1 
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4. Results 
With the objective of quantifying and empirically analysing the variables in relation to the 
political party in government in each Autonomous Community (PP, PSOE or a nationalist-
regionalist party), a descriptive analysis of the variables under study was first undertaken. 
Subsequently, a Kruskal-Wallis contrast was carried out. The reason for choosing this non-
parametric test was determined by the characteristics of the sample, which does not meet the 
requirement of normality, nor are the variances for the analysed variables homogeneous. To 
achieve these objectives, the SPSS 22.0 statistical program was used. 
4.1. Descriptive analysis of the variables 
Table 3 presents the average values for each variable under study. The results thus indicate 
that the highest level of expenditure per employee tends to occur in regions with socialist 
governments, while the highest levels of total expenditure, volume of assets and asset 
turnover can be found in communities with nationalist or regional governments. 
In the communities with PP governments, however, the greater return on investment 
(ROA) stands out, despite the fact that the regional broadcasters administered by nationalist-
regionalist party governments have a much higher operating income than the networks 
overseen by PP or PSOE governments. In fact, the amount of operating income of broadcasters 
managed by nationalist or regionalist parties is more than double that of broadcasters that 
operate under populist governments. Although these results must be assessed with caution, 
taking into account the particular income structures of the broadcasting entities, which are 
closely linked to public subsidies, and the frequent occurrence of negative ROAs as a direct 
consequence of equally negative results; the observed trend suggests the probability of 
political influence on economic management, which varies depending on the political party 
in power. The higher level of expenditure and income (taking into account that the latter 
depends heavily on public subsidies) observed in communities with nationalist or regionalist 
governments can be explained by particular features, such as the commitment to a second 
official language, with the consequent increase in production costs, or that they look to forge 
a stronger socio-cultural relationship with their audience. In fact, networks managed by the 
nationalist-regionalist parties obtained a greater total audience share than the other two 
network groups, with a difference of more than 2.5 audience share points. This result is 
especially evident in communities where one or more television networks broadcast in the 
regional language. 
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Table 3: Descriptive analysis of the variables. 
Variable under study 
and political party N Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Expenditure 
per employee 
(in euro) 
PP 86 48,654.47 33,496.54 27,712 338,426 
PSOE 77 53,937.01 19,971.61 21,882 119,218 
Nationalists 51 47,643.10 8,506.32 29,640 67,494 
Total 214 50,314.17 24,791.58 21,882 338,426 
Total 
expenses (in 
euro) 
PP 86 78,545,431.74 58,491,806.11 1,407,722 216,719,333 
PSOE 77 75,007,380.88 54,630,175.46 9,696,444 214,694,532 
Nationalists 47 104,096,423.55 70,408,100.52 19,666,821 232,963,235 
Total 210 82,966,701.74 60,823,976.39 1,407,722 232,963,235 
Total assets 
PP 86 68,229,388.23 45,081,691.82 3,947,367 216,655,103 
PSOE 77 77,713,133.60 77,562,787.84 8,502,291 339,881,990 
Nationalists 49 109,186,595.55 96,202,531.20 7,044,967 357,789,882 
Total 212 81,140,480.46 73,115,664.03 3,947,367 357,789,882 
ROA 
PP 86 -0.81 0.61 -2.16 0.16 
PSOE 72 -0.70 0.62 -2.17 0.02 
Nationalists 49 -0.50 0.76 -3.31 0.00 
Total 207 -0.70 0.66 -3.31 0.16 
Turnover of 
assets 
PP 86 0.54 0.46 0.00 1.70 
PSOE 77 0.88 0.72 0.03 2.97 
Nationalists 49 1.18 0.74 0.05 3.19 
Total 212 0.81 0.68 0.00 3.19 
Total 
audience 
share 
PP 85 11.46 6.35 0.00 22.20 
PSOE 75 12.29 6.45 1.70 26.10 
Nationalists 51 15.61 6.68 5.40 29.30 
Total 211 12.76 6.65 0.00 29.30 
4.2. Kruskal-Wallis Contrast 
In the expenses section, non-parametric tests confirm the correlation between the political 
party in the regional government and the variables of 'Expenditure per employee' and 'Total 
expenses', as well as the regional networks' ratio of total Audience Share. Thus the hypothesis 
of independence for the year on year variation ratio of expenditure per employee cannot be 
refuted, nor that for the year on year variation ratio of total audience share. A similar analysis 
of the variables linked to the assets and income of the different entities yielded the following 
results, in which the dependence between the ROA and the ratio of asset turnover and the 
political party in the regional government is confirmed. However, dependence with volume 
of assets or the year on year variation of this was not confirmed.  
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Table 4: Non-parametric test. 
 Null hypothesis Test Sig. Decision 
1 
The distribution of expenditure per 
employee (V2) is the same across the 
political party categories (V1) 
Kruskal-Wallis test 
for independent 
samples 
0.005 Reject the null hypothesis 
2 
The distribution of expenses (V3) is the 
same across the political party 
categories (V1) 
Kruskal-Wallis test 
for independent 
samples 
0.042 Reject the null hypothesis 
3 
The distribution of total assets (V4) is 
the same across the political party 
categories (V1) 
Kruskal-Wallis test 
for independent 
samples 
0.86 Do not reject the 
null hypothesis 
4 
The distribution of ROA (V5) is the 
same across the political party 
categories (V1) 
Kruskal-Wallis test 
for independent 
samples 
0.018 Reject the null hypothesis 
5 
The distribution of asset turnover (V6) 
is the same across the political party 
categories (V1) 
Kruskal-Wallis test 
for independent 
samples 
0.000 Reject the null hypothesis 
6 
The distribution of total audience share 
(V7) is the same across the political 
party categories (V1) 
Kruskal-Wallis test 
for independent 
samples 
0.008 Reject the null hypothesis 
7 
The distribution of variation of total 
audience share is the same across the 
political party categories (V1) 
Kruskal-Wallis test 
for independent 
samples 
0.212 Do not reject the 
null hypothesis 
8 
The distribution of variation of total 
assets is the same across the political 
party categories (V1) 
Kruskal-Wallis test 
for independent 
samples 
0.735 Do not reject the 
null hypothesis 
Asymptotic significances are shown. The significance level is 0.05. 
 
Table 5 shows the results of the Kruskal-Wallis contrast for the three groups of broadcasters 
depending on the political party in power. As can be seen, there are significant differences for 
different economic variables depending on the political party in government in the 
Autonomous Community. 
 
Table 5: Kruskal-Wallis Test. 
Variable under 
study 
Expenditure 
per employee 
Total 
expenses Total assets ROA 
Turnover of 
assets 
Chi-squared 10.557 6.333 3.364 8.183 26.010 
g.l 2 2 2 2 2 
Asymptotic sig. 0.005 0.042 0.86 0.017 0.000 
Variable under 
study 
Annual 
variation in 
expenditure 
per employee 
Annual 
variation in 
total 
expenditure 
Annual 
variation in 
total assets 
Total 
audience 
share 
Annual 
variation in 
audience 
share 
Chi-squared 0.189 0.563 0.617 9.641 2.983 
g.l 2 2 2 2 2 
Asymptotic sig. 0.910 0.755 0.734 0.008 0.225 
a) Kruskal Wallis test. b) Cluster variable: political party. 
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The previously mentioned features which are specific to the broadcasting sector and the 
management model of the audiovisual corporations, significantly limit the accuracy of the 
comparative analysis of the economic-financial variables, since these can be affected by 
specific circumstances at the legislative, accounting and cultural levels. Notwithstanding the 
foregoing, the statistical analysis shows the correlation between the political party in the 
regional government and the ratio of expenditure per employee and total volume of 
expenditure, as well as the return on investment (ROA) and asset turnover. 
5. Conclusions 
Since their creation in the 1980s, regional public service broadcasters in Spain have 
contributed to economic, social and cultural development in their respective territories. 
Throughout their history, different political parties (Partido Popular, Spanish Workers 
Socialist Party and nationalist-regionalist parties in each Autonomous Community) have 
overseen the administration and management of these public service entities, and their 
decisions have governed the activity of the television networks. 
The literature on media economics has analysed the effects of regional public policies on 
the activity of regional broadcasting networks. However, the difference of the effects 
depending on the orientation of the political party that is in government in the Autonomous 
Community has not been examined. 
In light of this situation, this research analysed and quantified the influence that the 
political party running the regional public service broadcasters has on various economic 
variables that determine the productive activity of the broadcast entities. The analysis covers 
the period between 1995 and 2016, and takes in the many changes that have taken place in the 
accounting, legal and economic fields during that period. 
The results of the work indicate that the political party in government has a significant 
influence on the economic performance of the broadcast entities, especially in the cases of 
expenditure per employee, total expenditure, ROA, and asset turnover, as well as on the total 
audience share. 
In particular, the differences observed in the economic performance of the regional 
networks administered by nationalist-regionalist parties could be explained by the fact that 
the mission of these parties is not only to compete with the national television networks, but 
also to promote the broadcast of content strongly linked to the socio-cultural environment of 
the particular Autonomous Community, and the production of such content in other 
languages. 
In the context of the broadcast entities overseen by the PSOE and the PP, the highest 
values were observed for the variables of expenditure per employee in the former case and 
for ROA in the latter, which could suggest that these parties influence the focus of the 
broadcasters' management model, prioritising working conditions or organisational 
profitability respectively. However, the specific casuistry of the broadcast entities, the 
decisions made in circumstances that arise from legislative changes or the economic crisis, 
and also the context in which these have operated during the period under investigation 
suggest that an in-depth study of each case might be useful to confirm and measure the scope 
of the results obtained in this study. The high standard deviations observed for many of the 
variables analysed in certain television network groups, especially among the broadcast 
entities overseen by the Partido Popular, suggest, in fact, a large dispersion in the behaviour 
of television networks within the same group. 
Consequently, an interesting area of future research could be an analysis of the economic 
differences between the television networks within each group, together with an extension of 
this research to other comparable contexts such as local broadcasters or the different 
European national broadcasters. 
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Among the factors considered as limitations of this study, it should be taken into account 
that for the years when there was a change of political party in government in the Autonomous 
Community, the economic data of that year was credited to the party that was in government 
at the beginning of the year. In addition, governments made up of coalitions of several parties 
were not considered as an analysis group, and data relating to that year was credited to the 
party that presided over the Autonomous Community. 
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